Sos Fault Modelling at the Architectural Level in an Emergency Response Case Study by Ingram C et al.
 Newcastle University ePrints 
 
Ingram C, Riddle S, Fitzgerald J, Al-Lawati AHJ, Alrbaiyan A. Sos Fault 
Modelling at the Architectural Level in an Emergency Response Case 
Study. In: Workshop on Engineering Dependable Systems of Systems (EDSoS). 
2014, Newcastle, UK. 
Copyright: 
© The authors have retained the retained copyright for this conference. Details of the conference can be 
found at http://conferences.ncl.ac.uk/edsos2014/ 
Date deposited:  24-07-2014 
Version of file:  Author Manuscript 
 
 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported License 
 ePrints – Newcastle University ePrints 
http://eprint.ncl.ac.uk 
 
SoS Fault Modelling at the Architectural Level in an
Emergency Response Case Study
Claire Ingram, Steve Riddle, John Fitzgerald, Sakina A.H.J. Al-Lawati, Afra Alrbaiyan
Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK
Email: claire.ingram@ncl.ac.uk, steve.riddle@ncl.ac.uk, john.fitzgerald@ncl.ac.uk
Abstract—Systems of systems (SoSs) are particularly vulner-
able to faults and other threats to their dependability, but fre-
quently inhabit domains that demand high levels of dependability.
For this reason fault tolerance analysis is important in SoS
engineering. The COMPASS project has previously proposed a
Fault Tolerance Architecture Framework (FMAF), consisting of a
collection of viewpoints that support systematic reasoning about
faults in an SoS at the architectural level. The FMAF has been
demonstrated previously with an analysis of an example fault in
an emergency response SoS. In this paper we present further
examples of the FMAF’s practical use, by analysing different
types of faults drawn from the same emergency response case
study. These example faults exercise different aspects of the
FMAF, demonstrate its use in more complex fault modelling
scenarios, and raise new questions for further development.
I. INTRODUCTION
Systems of systems (SoSs) face particular challenges that
can increase the risk of faults, whilst typically inhabiting
domains which require a high degree of dependability. There
are many examples of the types of faults that SoSs may face.
For example, communication problems can compromise the
distributed constituent systems (CSs) with no warning. CSs
are likely to be different ages and make different assumptions;
mismatched assumptions (e.g., architectural mismatch [1]) are
a real risk. CSs may be independently managed, may be
unaware of the SoS or reluctant to participate in it, and may
evolve without considering the needs of the SoS or providing
advance notice, so there is a high risk of unanticipated failures
in SoS functionality. Error propagation may be complex,
governance difficult to track, and recovery strategies may not
be clear. This is particularly a problem in cases where the
failure of one CS may result in an SoS-level fault which must
be detected by another CS, or which could be detected by
one of several separate CSs, and in cases where CSs which
may be required to implement extra (possibly costly) recovery
activities. If CSs have separate ownership and motivations,
there is often a need to consider the options in advance and
agree which CSs are responsible for detecting errors or for
implementing and executing recovery strategies.
For these reasons, we argue that an architectural approach
to fault modelling is particularly useful for the SoS reliability
engineer. The COMPASS1 project has developed a Fault
Modelling Architectural Framework (FMAF) that provides a
systematic approach to capturing fault tolerance aspects of
SoSs. The COMPASS FMAF has been described in previous
publications [2], [3], [4] and its practical use demonstrated
with the modelling of a single fault drawn from an emergency
1http://www.compass-research.eu/
response SoS. In this paper we present an extension of previous
work, modelling further faults extracted from the same case
study. The additional faults exercise new aspects of the FMAF,
such as the inclusion of faults which may be detected by
multiple constituent systems.
The rest of this paper is laid out as follows: Section II
briefly summarises some related work and Section III intro-
duces the FMAF. Section IV introduces our case study and
previous work. Sections VI and V study two separate faults
using the FMAF approach. Finally Section VII presents our
conclusions. Work presented here forms part of the COMPASS
project, building further on work presented in [3].
II. RELATED WORK
Fault tolerant architectures have been widely studied in the
literature (e.g., see [5]). Architectural approaches are useful
for modelling fault tolerance within an SoS. Some previous
researchers have adopted an architectural approach, demon-
strating feasibility. For example, [6] and [7] use UML to model
erroneous behaviour in embedded systems, whilst [8] use
SysML for analysis of dependable complex physical systems.
SysML is also used in [9] for verifying safety requirements in
embedded, safety-critical control systems.
III. FAULT MODELLING ARCHITECTURAL FRAMEWORK
The COMPASS Fault Modelling Architectural Framework
(FMAF) encompasses a series of viewpoints to aid the SoS
reliability engineer. In particular it supports:
• Definition of faults, errors and failures in an SoS
• Identification of and reasoning about causal chains
• Definition and identification of the boundaries of CSs
• Definition of erroneous states and recovery scenarios.
Table I (taken from [4]) presents the viewpoints of the FMAF,
and briefly summarises their purpose.
When discussing fault tolerance in SoSs, we adapt a well-
known dependability taxonomy which was initially provided
by [10]. Under this taxonomy, a failure is a deviation from
expected service, visible outside a given system. At the SoS
level, the failure is a deviation from SoS-level service. An error
is part of the SoS state that can lead to a failure. A fault is the
cause of an error. We note that, within an SoS, a failure at the
level of a single CS becomes a fault at the level of the SoS. A
set of rules for ensuring consistency between the viewpoints
is described in [3]
TABLE I. INFORMAL DESCRIPTION OF THE FMAF VIEWPOINTS (TAKEN FROM [4])
Name Description
St
ru
ct
ur
al
Fault/Error/Failure Definition Define faults, errors and failures of the SoS. Faults, errors or failures may be generalised into abstract categories.
Threats Chain View Identifies progression of faults through errors to failures and relationships between the dependability threats and the constituents.
Fault Tolerance Structure Shows the composition of the SoS with the required redundancy to tolerate a given fault.
Fault Tolerance Connections Shows connections and interfaces between constituents of the SoS with the required redundancy to tolerate a given fault.
Includes all the constituents identified in the respective Fault Tolerance Structure View.
B
eh
av
io
ur
al
Erroneous/Recovery Processes Identifies the processes of the SoS, including erroneous behaviour and any required recovery processes.
Erroneous/Recovery Scenarios Models behaviour in the presence of errors (with and without recovery) as scenarios. Shows erroneous behaviour propagation
and recovery procedure triggers.
Fault Activation Defines the behaviour within an SoS process and identifies when faults may be activated, what happens after activation and
where in the process the error may be detected.
Recovery Defines the behaviour of the recovery procedures that are triggered once an error has been detected.
IV. CASE STUDY AND PREVIOUS WORK
Our case study is an emergency response SoS, supplied
by the Italian company Insiel. Insiel supports an SoS in
northern Italy incorporating separate emergency services (such
as fire departments and ambulance services). The services are
separately managed and funded. The SoS provides a single
emergency point of contact for the public, and delivers the
appropriate aid within a target time frame. The case study
has been described in previous publications [2], [4], [3] that
illustrate the use of the FMAF using a single potential fault
drawn from the case study (the failure of the radio system used
for communications).
In our analysis, we concentrate on the services within the
emergency response SoS that supply medical aid. For the
purposes of the fault tolerance analysis presented here, the
constituent systems of the emergency response SoS include:
• A system of distributed, mobile Emergency Response
Units (ERUs), comprising one or more medical staff and
a driver.
• A radio system employed for communications
• A mobile phone system employed as a backup for the
radio
• A central call centre which consists of expert operators
and software (‘CUS’) to provide a workflow
In [3] the nominal behaviour of the SoS and initial recovery
processes for one fault (failure of the radio system) are
presented in SysML. The simplified nominal behaviour of the
CSs described above can be briefly summarised as follows:
• Call centre receives and processes emergency calls using
the CUS
• Call centre operator finds an appropriate ERU (which may
be idle or already on a lower priority assignment) and
dispatches it to the new emergency
• The ERU travels to the target, dispenses aid and sends
updates on current status over the radio to the call centre
• The call centre workflow software (the ‘CUS’) tracks
specified metrics e.g. time to arrive
• The ERU staff decide on the next action: either further aid
is not necessary and the ERU returns to idle state; or the
casualty is transported to hospital for further treatment
The nominal behaviour of the system described here is
our starting point for describing the emergency response SoS.
Three example faults for this SoS were proposed in [2] (also
shown in Table II). Fault 1 has been modelled using the FMAF
TABLE II. EMERGENCY RESPONSE SOS FAULTS OF INTEREST (TAKEN
FROM [2])
Fault Description Error Recovery
Detected by
Fault 1 Complete ERU and/ The ERU driver uses his/her mobile
failure of or call phone. If there is no mobile phone
the radio centre coverage, the personnel uses
system landline phones (e.g. the phone
of the patient)
Fault 2 An ERU ERU ERU with patient: a new ERU
breaks down crew or without medical personnel is sent,
or crashes call centre to retrieve the patient and the ERU
crew. ERU driver waits for recovery
ERU without patient: a new ERU or
a car is sent to retrieve ERU crew
(except driver, as he waits for
assistance)
Fault 3 An operator Call centre Re-direction of the ERU to the
sends an operator, correct target location (assuming
ERU to the caller or that this can be resolved from the
wrong ERU information available), or select
location closer ERU
viewpoints previously [2]; in this paper we present FMAF
models and analysis of Faults 2 and 3 for the first time. We
consider Fault 3 first, in Section V, presenting a selection
of FMAF viewpoints to model the SoS behaviour. There are
several possibilities for presenting Fault Activation Views; we
present one approach in our analysis of Fault 3, and in analysis
of Fault 2 we present a second approach, for comparison.
The alternative method adopted in Fault 2 is described in
Section VI.
V. FAULT 3: ERU IN INCORRECT LOCATION
Fault 3 arises when ‘an operator sends an ERU to wrong
location’ [2].
A. Threats Chain Views
The FMAF Threats Chain View (TCV) illustrates where in
the SoS:
• the initial fault is located;
• the error can be detected; and
• the failure can be observed (this should be outside the
SoS, as failures are observable at the external boundary
of the system/SoS)
The TCV requires us to address the question which CS is
responsible for activating the initial fault?. On considering all
possibilities, we find that the same outcome (the ERU receives
incorrect information from the operator) may have several
quite different sources: the caller; the call centre operator; the
radio system; or the ERU crew. Dependent on this, the fault is
detectable in different ways by different CSs, so we partition
the fault for separate analysis as follows:
1) Fault 3.1: the caller provides poor quality location infor-
mation
2) Fault 3.2: the call centre operator receives good infor-
mation from the caller, but makes a mistake and provides
incorrect location when transcribing this, or when trans-
mitting it to the ERU over phone or radio
3) Fault 3.3: the radio quality is poor and the ERU mis-hears
the location
4) Fault 3.4: the call centre and radio provide good informa-
tion, but the ERU crew makes a mistake when transcribing
or recording the target destination
We do not have space here for a full analysis of all four faults;
we concentrate on the scenarios presented by 3.1 and 3.2 as
representative samples.
Examples of TCVs are presented in Figure 1 (for Fault 3.1)
and Figure 2 (for Fault 3.2). According to our dependability
taxonomy, a fault should be introduced by a CS, and visible to
external entities only at the boundary of the SoS (as a failure).
In Figure 1, however, the caller both introduces the fault
(incorrect location information), and also is responsible for
detecting it, which is not correct according to our dependability
taxonomy. Fault 3.1 is not in fact a ‘fault’: the SoS is behaving
as expected, and the poor outcome is a direct result of poor
information received from the environment (we regard the
caller as part of the environment, not a CS). The TCV is not a
good vehicle for modelling propagation of incorrect input data;
the concept of a an internal fault arising and propagating does
not apply and we regard Figure 1 as an incorrect usage of the
view. However, we do desire the emergency SoS to cope well
with the inevitable eventuality that some information received
from the environment will be of poor quality; this needs to be
considered in the design of nominal and recovery behaviour,
so although the TCV is not appropriate for Fault 3.1, other
FMAF approaches are still useful.
Figure 2 shows that Fault 3.2 is activated in the Call Centre
constituent system. In this situation the fault introduced by the
call system becomes an error state at the level of the SoS,
which can be detected by either the ERU or the call centre
itself. Finally, if no detection and recovery take place, the error
propagates to a failure visible at the external boundary of the
SoS as a failure to attend the target casualty.
B. Fault Tolerance Connections view
In [3] a nominal ‘connections view’ was presented for the
SoS, in which:
• A Phone System provides a connection to the external
environment (the Caller) and the Call Centre, permitting
the two to communicate.
• A Radio System supplies interfaces to, and requires
interfaces from, the ERU and the Call Centre, permitting
these two CSs to communicate.
• The ERU provides a connection to the external environ-
ment in the form of the target casualty that the ERU
attends.
<<Error>> 
:ERU Travelling to 
incorrect location 
<<Threats Chain View>> {faultsOfInterest = Caller provides wrong target location} 
ibd ThreatsChain [Fault3.1] 
Fig. 1. Threats Chain View of Fault 3.1
<<Error>> 
:ERU Travelling to 
incorrect location 
<<Threats Chain View>> {faultsOfInterest = The operator sends an ERU to the wrong location} 
ibd ThreatsChain [Fault3.2] 
Fig. 2. Threats Chain View of Fault 3.2
Fig. 3. Fault Tolerance Connections View (FTCV) for Fault 3.1
The caller and the target are modelled separately because
they may not be in the same location. The Phone System
and Radio System are modelled explicitly because they are
key systems upon which the SoS depends, but are associated
with some known risks (e.g., radio reception is not possible in
some mountainous or remote areas). Their inclusion permits
us to model our reliance on them explicitly. The Phone System
provides two possible connections; one for the use of external
entities, and a separate one for the use of CSs inside the SoS.
The FMAF Fault Tolerance Connections View (FTCV)
shows the internal and external SoS connections which may be
necessary for fault tolerance. We present an FPCV in Figure 3,
depicting the same SoS internal and external connections
described above and in [3], but adapted to cope with Fault
3.1. In this scenario, the original caller provides poor quality
location information. In some cases, after acquiring better
information, the caller wishes to recontact the call centre. This
may require consideration to be paid to connections between
the SoS and the original caller, in order to to allow the caller
to phone back with new details. For example, the caller may
be provided with details of the specific dispatch office that is
dealing with the emergency, or perhaps the Phone System can
recognise an incoming call from a number already associated
with an ongoing emergency, and pre-populate the operator’s
screen with known details.
Alternatively, in some situations it is possible that the caller
does not provide quality location information and does not
recontact the call centre (e.g., they may hang up or be cut
off before the operator can reconfirm address details or may
be too distracted to provide a quality address) and although
it may be possible to ascertain the location of many callers
from their phone number this is not always the case (e.g., the
caller may not be in the same location as the target, or may
be in a moving vehicle). In a situation like this, responsibility
for detecting the error falls upon the ERU, which will realise
the problem on arrival at the incorrect location, and then will
contact the call centre for advice. After confirming the location
of the ERU matches the location that was provided by the
caller, the call centre operator needs further information about
the correctness of the information they provided. Sometimes
the operator may need to re-contact the caller to confirm the
correct location. For this reason, the FTCV model for Fault
3.1 shows an additional connection that allows the call centre
operator to phone the original caller back. Other variations of
Fault 3 may also require modified or additional connections
within the SoS. For example, Figure 3 does not include the
Mobile Phone System which can be used as a backup in the
event of a Radio System failure, but the connections with the
Mobile Phone system become important when modelling Fault
3.3 (the radio quality is too poor to hear the location clearly).
An FTCV for Fault 3.3. may depict the ERU crew making use
of the Mobile Phone system to connect to the EmergencyCallIF
provided by the Phone System.
C. Fault Activation Views
Fault Activation Views (FAVs) are behaviour models which
identify where, within the nominal behaviour, a fault can arise
and which CS(s) will detect the fault. Figure 4 presents a Fault
Activation View (FAV) for Fault 3.2 (the call centre operator
introduces the fault by providing incorrect details to the ERU).
The fault’s activation, detection and recovery are represented
using interruptible regions. There are three interruptible re-
gions in this FAV; one to represent the activation of the fault
(within the call centre), and two representing opportunities
to detect the resulting erroneous state and initiate recovery.
Two CSs are capable of detecting the error: the operator may
detect this themselves (e.g., by checking recordings of the
call) and recontacting the ERU; or alternatively the ERU may
detect the erroneous state after arriving at an incorrect address.
Each detection event prompts the beginning of the recovery
Fig. 4. Fault Activation View for Fault 3.2
process; for example, in Figure 4, the error detection leads
to the process ‘Start Recovery 3.2a (CC)’ or ‘Start Recovery
3.2b (ERU)’. These recovery processes differ very slightly;
for example, if the ERU detects the fault, then the ERU will
need to contact the call centre for advice. However, both
recovery processes involve the operator clarifying the genuine
emergency location (e.g., via recordings of the original call)
and transmitting it to the ERU, or selecting an alternative ERU
if it is closer (omitted here).
D. Erroneous/Recovery Processes and Scenarios
Analysis of Fault 3 has identified some new recovery
procedures to be designed and enacted when specific faults
are uncovered. For example, we can see that procedures need
to be designed for: the call centre operator, for situations
when more information about location is required or where
the original caller phones back with extra location details; and
for the ERU, when arriving at an incorrect location. We model
these using the FMAF Erroneous/Recovery Processes and Er-
roneous/Recovery Scenarios (omitted due to space limitations).
VI. FAULT 2: ERU BREAKS DOWN OR CRASHES
Fault 2 arises when an ERU has broken down or crashed.
A. Fault Activation View and Recovery View
An FAV for Fault 2 is presented in Figure 5. In trying to
answer the question of which activity is interrupted, we find
that the fault may arise in one of several different stages of
ERU behaviour. The possibilities are:
• Fault 2.1: the ERU is currently travelling to a target
• Fault 2.2: the ERU is currently transporting a patient to
a hospital
• Fault 2.3: the ERU is not currently on assignment
Recovery processes may differ for each of these scenarios,
so we partition them (they can be amalgamated later if we
discover that detection and recovery do not differ). For some
of these scenarios, recovery simply consists of providing the
medical crew with transport and removing or repairing the
original vehicle. However, if the ERU is travelling to or trans-
porting a patient, then in addition to these steps an alternative
Fig. 5. Fault Activation View of Fault 2
ERU must be directed to take over patient transportation,
because waiting for repair or a replacement vehicle introduces
unacceptable delay. Figure 5 presents an FAV for Fault 2.1
(FAVs of Faults 2.2. and 2.3 omitted due to space limitations).
The fault is depicted as activating during the ERU nominal
process ‘ServiceRescue’.
Initially for Fault 2 we assume that the ERU crew will be
the first to detect the problem. However in some situations the
ERU crew may be incapacitated and unable to communicate
with the SoS (e.g., they are injured themselves, or the radio
equipment is damaged). In this case, detection falls to the call
centre operator. The operator may be alerted to the problem,
e.g., via phone calls from members of the public. Or the
operator may raise the alarm after being unable to contact the
ERU within a reasonable timeframe. For this reason, Figure 5
presents two possible detection events, each resulting in a
separate recovery process; one recovery process is initiated if
the ERU themselves detect and report the fault, and the other
recovery strategy is initiated by the call centre operator.
Figure 6 presents a recovery view for Recovery Process
2.1a. This recovery is appropriate for Fault 2.1, and is initiated
by the call centre (as shown in Figure 5). An FMAF recovery
view shows what action is taken by each CS as the SoS
recovers from the fault. In this case, Fault 2 was activated
before the ERU reached the target, so recovery involves finding
a new ERU, (‘ERU 2’), to attend the original target, (possibly
diverting an ERU on a lower priority assignment). In addition,
the original vehicle and its crew must also be dealt with,
which may involve dispatching repair teams, or initiating a
new rescue event if the ERU crew themselves require medical
aid.
As noted earlier, either the ERU or the call centre can
detect Fault 2.1 and initiate recovery. The recovery strategies
employed by the two CSs are not the same. If the ERU is
able to ‘detect’ the fault on behalf of the SoS, then their first
action will be to contact the call centre operator via radio to
report the problem and request appropriate aid for themselves
and a replacement to take over their assignment. However,
if the ERU are unable to detect the fault for the SoS, then
Fig. 6. Fault Recovery View for Fault 2 (before reaching the target)
the responsibility falls to the call centre operator. This is the
recovery process shown in Figure 6. The call centre operator
may have received a report from a third party with details
of the problem, or alternatively s/he may suspect that there
is a problem, but not know what has happened or therefore
what aid is required. Figure 6 shows two parallel activities
for the call centre operator during recovery: locating another
ERU to take over the original assignment; and taking some
actions to remedy the immobilised original vehicle and crew.
There is a conditional branch here: if the operator knows that
the original ERU is simply broken down, the required actions
include dispatching transportation for the crew and dispatching
mechanics for the vehicle. Alternatively, if the operator knows
that the ERU has crashed, actions involve creating a new rescue
event and following the usual procedure to dispatch medical
aid to an emergency.
The question still arises of what the operator should do
if they suspect there is a problem (e.g., because the ERU
has been uncontactable for some time) but does not have
details of the nature of the problem (e.g., it’s unknown whether
there is a break down or an accident). One possible strategy
is to assume the worse case scenario immediately: the call
centre operator could dispatch a vehicle with aid if the ERU is
uncontactable for some predetermined period of time. This will
lead to crashed and broken down ERUs being recovered much
more quickly than otherwise, but it risks wasting resources
if - for example - the ERU is in a radio-shadowed area and
not suffering any vehicle problems. Alternatively, the ERU
suppliers can elect to take some other action - e.g., installing
devices that can self-report some types of vehicle problems;
this requires a business case to consider the probable cost
benefits to each CS affected by the activation of the fault and
initiation of recovery. There is a need to model and agree upon
the correct recovery procedure in advance, because in this case
the behaviour and installed devices of one CS (the ERU) need
to be well understood by another CS (the call centre) in order
to diagnose a problem; and because the call centre will need
to take responsibility for initiating recovery action (with an
associated cost) based on the expected behaviour of the ERU
crew and/or hardware. The FMAF models can be useful here
for identifying different activities that can be affected by a
fault (thereby aiding with partitioning faults which have similar
causes but different recoveries, as is the case for Faults 2.1,
2.2. and 2.3) and clearly showing which CS can detect the
problem and will be initiating recovery.
The FAV is also helpful for identifying where nominal
procedures may need to be modified as a result of designing
recovery procedures. For example, after considering options
for recovering from Fault 2.1, the reliability engineer may
decide that the call centre should monitor the ERU’s response
times. There is a concept of a timer in the call centre’s nominal
behaviour, visible in [3]; the reliability engineers can return
to this nominal behaviour model and modify or extend is as
necessary to permit the appropriate recovery.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have briefly demonstrated the use of
the COMPASS-developed FMAF approach for modelling fault
tolerance in an SoS at the architectural level. We have built
further on a case study which was previously published with
a single fault modelled; our contribution here goes further by
demonstrating the modelling of two quite different faults in
the same SoS.
In this paper we present two faults which may be detected
by more than one CS. For example, Fault 2.1 (ERU crashes or
breaks down en route to target) may be detected by the ERU
crew, or alternatively by the call centre. Fault 3.2 (call centre
transmits incorrect location) presents an example of a fault
which may be detected by two different CSs, and also where
the fault activation and detection/recovery may be allocated
to different CSs. The identity of the detector is significant,
because this dictates which recovery processes are needed. For
example, for Fault 2, in cases where the ERU detects the fault,
details on ERU status and needs are available and narrow down
the necessary recovery actions. However, if the call centre acts
as the detector and the ERU is uncontactable, the call centre
does not necessarily have access to these details and must make
some assumptions.
We have employed two different methods of presenting
the multiple detector roles in our FAV diagrams for Faults 2
and 3. In Figure 5 we have employed an interruptible region
for the detection of Fault 2, and initiation of recovery by
the ERU, and in the same diagram a separate interruptible
region for the detection of Fault 2 and initiation of recovery
by the call centre. However, in Figure 4 we have employed a
single interruptible region to depict detection of Fault 3 and
initiation of recovery by either the ERU or the call centre.
There are advantages and disadvantages for each method.
Employing separate interruptible regions for the two different
‘dectector’ roles (as in Figure 5) allows us to demonstrate
clearly where the responsibility for the detection and recovery
lies. This is particularly pertinent for an SoS, where the
separate constituent systems are independent and autonomous.
Representing the initiation of similar recovery processes to-
gether (e.g., Figure 4), is useful for situations where separate
recoveries need to be considered together, and ensures that the
‘flow’ of processes is easily followed. This is important for an
SoS, where there may be events arising in different constituent
systems in parallel. The FMAF modelling approach is a useful
tool for reliability engineers, who may need to initiate some
negotiations and agreements between independently managed
and funded CSs, particularly in cases where one CS may need
to accept responsibility for detecting and recovering from faults
introduced by others.
There are several areas for future and ongoing work in this
area of SoS fault tolerance, including: modelling remaining
faults in the TMS case study; including additional concepts
from the dependability taxonomy [10]; incorporating the newly
identified extensions into the FMAF framework definition; and
the development of tools and techniques to support linking
between architectural models and fault analysis tools (such as
HiP-HOPS2) and formal verification techniques.
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